During the night

Dawn – Army of the Potomac

Winfield Hancock’s Second Corps was placed on Cemetery Ridge, to the left of Olliver Howard’s Eleventh Corps, with Daniel Sickles’ Third Corps took the place of Geary’s Division, extending the line to just short of Little Round Top. Robert Tyler’s Reserve Artillery was placed in reserve behind the front.

The Fifth Corps, now under the command of Major General George Sykes since Meade was promoted to Army command, arrived after a 43 mile march from Union Mills, Maryland made in two days with only four hours rest. They were placed in reserve behind the center.

Two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserves from the Washington Defenses under the command of Samual Crawford had also been marching day and night for two days to join the army and arrived to become the Third Division of the Fifth Corps.

Dawn – Army of Northern Virginia

When Lee met with Ewell the evening before they had talked about using Johnson’s Division in the morning to seize Culp’s Hill, which they thought might be undefended. But Lee sent an aide to Ewell instructing him to hold off moving Johnson’s Division until he heard the guns of Longstreet’s attack.

8 a.m.

Early morning

Finally, Lee went to meet with Ewell and explore the options of an attack on Culp’s Hill. He returned with the decision that it only would be useful if in conjunction with another attack elsewhere on the Union line. Ewell would launch his attack when he heard Longstreet’s guns.

11:00 a.m.

Longstreet asked permission to delay until the arrival of Evander Law’s Alabama Brigade, part of Hood’s Division. It had been detached at New Guilford, about 25 miles from Gettysburg over the Blue Ridge, had been marching since 3 a.m. to rejoin the army, and was close. Longstreet was missing one of his three divisions; he did not want to miss one of his remaining eight brigades as well. Lee agreed.

Lee took the unusual step of instructing McLaws exactly how he wanted him to attack. Usually Lee’s method was to bring his troops into contact with the enemy and provide an overall tactical plan, then allow his senior generals to decide the details. It was a clear message to Longstreet that there would be no more discussion.

A.P. Hill ordered Anderson’s Division to move into position on Seminary Ridge North of Pitzer Woods. Lee intended to add Anderson to Longstreet’s attack.

Before noon

Sickles’ Third Corps had the worst terrain in the Union line to defend. His stretch of Cemetery Ridge barely had any elevation and was overshadowed by higher ground around it. After conferring, Meade sent him Artillery Chief Henry Hunt to post his guns. Sickles wanted to move his artillery forward about 1,500 yards to high ground along Emmitsburg Road. Hunt would not approve the advance on his own authority and recommended that Sickles reconnoiter beyond Emmitsburg Road.

Noon

Jeb Stuart’s three exhausted brigades of cavalry arrived from the north after their extended ride around the Union army. Stuart had a private interview with Lee; no record of what was said exists, but it was probably uncomfortable. Hampton’s Cavalry Brigade was ordered to cover the army’s left flank and took a position on the Hunterstown Road.

Anderson’s Division arrived at its position on Seminary Ridge.

Sickles sent out his United States Sharpshooters to see what was in Pitzer Woods on the other side of Emmitsburg Road. They found it full of Alabama troops from Wright’s Brigade of Anderson’s Division and got into a spirited firefight.

This threat made Sickles even more unhappy with the position of his Third Corps, overlooked as it was by higher ground. After several messages to Meade, who was occupied on the right flank, Sickles advanced his corps to what he felt was a more defensible position. It was on higher ground, but Sickles did not have the manpower to hold the longer lines. He was spread very thin, and far from support. Hancock and Gibbon, watching from their Second Corp position on Sickles’ right flank, were astonished.

Law’s Brigade arrived and joined Longstreet, who began his approach march. McLaws’ Division led the way, followed by Hood. They were to head south, cross the Fairfield Road at Black Horse Tavern, and continue on the road to Pitzer’s School.

2:00 – 4:00 p.m. – behind Confederate lines

Some time was spent finding an alternate route. More time was spent backtracking the column almost to its starting point. The new route went for quite a distance on a narrow farm road requiring the regiments to “break files to the rear” to squeeze between the fences, slowing the march. Longstreet and McLaws “manifested considerable irritation,” according to Brigadier General Joseph B. Kershaw.

3:00 p.m.

Just before 4:00 p.m.

Informed that Sickles was not in position, Meade took two actions: first, he ordered Sykes’ Fifth Corps to leave its reserve position and move forward to cover the gap Sickles created and “hold it at all hazards.” Second, he directed Gouverneur Warren, the Army’s Chief Engineer, to Little Round Top to see what protection, if any, Sickles had provided for that important terrain.

Meade then rode to see in person what Sickles had done – and when he arrived was horrified. Sickles asked if he should withdraw to his assigned position. But it was too late. Longstreet’s artillery – 36 guns in 8 batteries – opened up. Meade shouted a reply over the guns, “I wish to God you could but the enemy won’t let you!”

4:00 p.m. – Hood’s Division

The assault was led by Law’s Alabama Brigade, who had been marching since 3 a.m., and Robertson’s Texas Brigade (Wich included the 3rd Arkansas, an honorary Texas regiment). Benning’s and Anderson’s Georgia Brigades were in the second line.

Because of the broken terrain, unsure objectives, and last minute changes to orders, Hood’s Division quickly began to diverge into separate attacks. Five regiments pushed straight forward for Big Round Top, four for the Devil’s Den from the west, two for Little Round Top, four for the Wheatfield, and the two on the far right flank were squeezed out of line and ended up following Plum Run to the Devil’s Den from the south.

Hood was leading from the front and was in a perfect position to fix all this, bring his division under control and concentrate its assault. But almost at the beginning of the attack he was badly wounded by an artillery explosion directly overhead. He would lose the use of his arm, although surgeons would save the arm itself, but ar present he was out of the battle and lucky to be alive. Evenader Law was the next in command but he was on his way to Round Top with his Alabamans and would not be informed that he was in command of the division for some time. And so the attack of Hood’s Division continued to fragment.

4:00 p.m. – East of Gettysburg

Ewell assigned his best gunner, 19 year old Major Joseph Latimer, to the problem. He massed 14 guns on Benner’s Hill, including six 20 pounder Parrotts, the largest guns on the field. Batteries on Seminary Ridge would add another 12 guns, though at longer range. Against this Union First Corps artillery chief Colonel Charles Wainwright could muster 25 guns on Cemetery Hill (including fout 20 pounders), assisted by 10 guns from the Eleventh Corps and 4 more on Culp’s Hill. There were also 33 guns facing west to deal with the Confederate pieces on Seminary Risge.

The result was a violent but unequal contest that lasted two hours. Latimer’s guns fired over 1,100 rounds. There were spectacular explosions of ammunition cases on both sides, but Latimer was eventually forced to request permission to withdraw his battered batteries. Ewell granted his request, asking him to leave one battery for Infantry support. Latimer was directing this battery when he was mortally wounded.

There was no effect on the Union right flank from Ewell’s diversion. No reinforcements were diverted there. Meade was able to continue sending help to his left flank. Union artillery chief Henry Hunt did ride up to see if his help was needed, but left after seeing that the Union guns were more than holding their own.

4:00 – Union Reactions

Gouverneur Warren made it to the crest of Little Round Top and found to his shock there was no one there but the Signal Corps detachment. He immediately sent aides riding hard across the field to find men to save the critical high ground. Sickles had no troops to spare; he was fighting for his life. Hancock sent one of his three divisions, although it weakened the Union line on the central part of Cemetery Ridge.

Major General George Sykes, Fifth Corps commander for only four days and normally a slow and steady by-the-book regular, unhesitatingly offered his lead division. When an aide searching for the division commander found Colonel Strong Vincent’s Brigade, Vincent immediately took responsibility for diverting his men to Little Round Top.

4:30 – Devil’s Den

4:30 – Little Round Top

They were the 4th and 5th Texas from Robertson’s Brigade and the 4th Alabama from Law’s Brigade. Robertson was with the other half of his brigade at the Devil’s Den and Law had left to take over division command from the wounded Hood, and all three regiments were acting independently. A while later 15th and 47th Alabama showed up, having taken a bit longer after climbing and descending Big Round Top on their way. Colonel William Oates was the senior officer. They quickly began an intense firefight with Vincent’s men, with occasional attacks by individual regiments.

4:30 p.m. – Northeast of Gettysburg

Battle of Hunterstown

Meanwhile, about about five miles northeast of Gettysburg Brigadier General Wade Hampton’s Confederate Cavalry Brigade had been ordered to cover Lee’s left flank and took a position on Hunterstown Road. He was attacked by Brigadier General George Custer’s cavalry brigade. Hampton’s men drove off the Union cavalry and pursued them into an ambush in Hunterstown. Hampton then regrouped for a major attack but Union Brigadier General Elon Farnsworth’s cavalry brigade arrived, and Hampton chose not to launch the attack. Instead he continued an artillery duel until darkness fell. The fighting caused Ewell to detach Brigadier General William “Extra Billy” Smith’s Brigade for flank security, taking it out of the fight for Culp’s Hill.

5:00 p.m. – Little Round Top

With Vincent’s Brigade heavily engaged on the south side of the hill Warren realized more reinforcements would be needed. He went in search, and was lucky to run into Brigadier General Stephen Weed’s Brigade that he had commanded before being promoted to Chief Engineer. He quickly ordered its lead regiment, Colonel Patrick O’ Rorke’s 140th New York. up the hill, with the three other regiments following.

5:00 p.m. – Rock Creek

5:30 p.m. – Little Round Top

The first crisis occurred on Vincent’s right flank. The 16th Michigan had only 150 men on the exposed flank of the battle line. Suddenly the colors, Colonel Norval Welch and about fifty men pulled back well behind the lines. Colonel Vincent ran over to rally the remaining men and was shot down, mortally wounded. The 48th Alabama and 4th Texas surged uphill to exploit the opening.

At the peak of the crisis Colonel Patrick O’Rorke erupted from the crest of the hill shouting, ‘down this way, boys!” followed by his 140th New York. O’Rorke fell dead, shot in the throat. Most of the first line of New Yorkers shot the unfortunate Confederate who fired the shot, who was found after the battle with 17 wounds on his body. The 450 New Yorkers extended and stabilized Vincent’s line, and the Alabamans and Texans fell back down the hill. Both sides had lost about a quarter of their men.

On the other flank of Vincent’s line both the 15th Alabama and the 20th Maine had suffered heavily and were almost out of ammunition. Colonel Oates led his 15th Alabama in one last charge that reached Chamberlain’s line. There was a wild struggle of hand to hand combat; the 20th Maine used the last of its ammunition, the 15th Alabama barely saved its flag, and Lieutenant Colonel John Oates, the Colonel’s brother, fell mortally wounded. The Alabamans were forced back down the hill.

Oates sent an aide to see if support could be had from his left, but the aide returned to say there were only Yankees in that direction. At the same time the 15th began to take fire from its far right, where the 20th Maine’s Company B and some skirmishing United States Sharpshooters were behind a stone wall, protecting the flank of the regiment. Oates decided that his only option was to withdraw. They would not try to pull back in order, but on a signal would run for the rear.

He never had a chance to give the signal. Chamberlain was also desperate and out of ammunition. He believe Oates was organizing for another assault, and had been ordered not to retreat. He felt his only option was to charge, with his only weapon still remaining – the bayonet.

The 20th Maine surged downhill with a shout. The front line of Alabamans threw down their guns and surrendered to what they thought was a suddenly reinforced enemy. The rest of the regiment ran, as Oakes admitted, “like a herd of wild cattle.” They were halfway up the slope of Big Round Top before they turned and reformed. Chamberlain recalled his men. Both sides had lost about half their men. Depending on whose figures are used, the 20th Maine captured between 218 to 368 prisoners.

5:30 p.m. – The Wheatfield

Brigadier General John Kershaw’s South Carolina Brigade moved forward followed by Semmes’ Brigade of Georgians. Longstreet rode along with them as far as Emmitsburg Road. The two brigades then swept across the Rose Farm. Waiting for them in woods behind the farm buildings were DeTrobriand’s Brigade from the Third Corps and Tilton’s and Sweitzer’s Brigades, newly arrived from the Fifth Corps.

Five fresh Union batteries had been rushed forward from the Artillery Reserve and posted along the Wheatfield Road. The plan was for three of Kershaw’s regiments on the left to wheel and attack the batteries. The movement was underway and the batteries were limbering up to pull out when someone – no one ever admitted who – gave the order for Kershaw’s regiments to “right flank!” Kershaw’s’ men did so, and turned away. The gunners returned to their pieces and mowed down the unfortunate Carolinians at close range.

At the same time Kershaw’s three regiments on his right struck into the Rose Woods, straight into Tilton’s Brigade. The three Union brigades were solidly holding their positions when it was the turn of the Union to make a terrible error. Brigadier General James Barnes, without consulting his division commander or with DeTrobriand’s Brigade that he was supporting, ordered Titlton’s and Sweitzer’s Brigades to pull back across the Wheatfield Road. Left alone, DeTrobriand had no choice but to withdraw as well. Fot a short time, the Confederacy controlled the Wheatfield.

Then Caldwell’s Division of Hancock’s Second Corps crossed the Wheatfield Road and began to deploy. The commander of its lead brigade, Colonel Edward Cross, was almost immediately mortally wounded. Next in the column was the legendary Irish Brigade, barely able to field 530 men between its five regiments, but still under its emerald flags. Zook’s Brigade came in on the right and like Cross, Samuel Zook quickly went down with a mortal wound. But Caldwell’s men fought their way toward the Stony Hill against Kershaw’s South Carolinians, whose advance was stalled..

Kershaw rode back to his support brigade, Paul Semmes’ Georgians. Semmes’ agreed to advance his brigade to fill a gap between Kershaw and Anderson, but before he could carry out his promise he was mortally wounded. Kershaw realized he would not be able to hold his position and ordered a withdrawal out of the woods back to the Rose farmstead.

Caldwell then sent in his last brigade, that of Colonel John Brooke. Brooke swept across the Wheatfield, then halted to unleash a heavy fire against Anderson’s Brigade. Brooke ordered “fix bayonets!” and pushed Anderson’s Georgians back through the woods. Caldwell’s Division had retaken the Wheatfield and most of the Rose Woods.

6:00 p.m. – The Peach Orchard

Barksdale swung northward to roll up the rest of Graham’s Bigade. Graham himself was wounded twice and was captured. Graham’s other regiments were overwhelmed and their survivors streamed toward the rear.

Daniel Sickles rode frantically about, pulling units out of line to patch holes elsewhere and pleading with retreating men to stay and fight. Barksdale’s line was approaching, and Sickles and his headquarters had started to withdraw when a solid shot struck him in the leg and almost completely tore it off. A tourniquet was applied and he was put on a stretcher to be carried away before the Mississippians arrived. To allay rumors that he had been killed, he had himself propped up and puffed on a cigar as he was carried away. His leg would be removed that night and he would be on his way to Washington, to continue his fight in the political arena. Meade ordered Hancock to take command of the Third Corps as well as he own Second Corps.

6:00 p.m. – The Wheatfield

Sweitzer had advanced into the Whearfield to support Caldwell’s Division, and suddenly found himself caught in fire coming from the Stony Hill and the Rose Woods. He went into a fighting widrawal. At one point Colonel Harrison Jeffords of the 4th Michigan personally defended his regiment’s flag and was bayoneted, probably the highest ranking officers to die by the bayonet in the Civil War. Sweitzer lost 40% of the thousand men of his brigade in the Whearfield.

The Confederates had retaken the Wheatfield and cleared it of Yankee troops except for two understrength brigades of United States Regulars under the command of Brigadier General Romeyn B. Ayres. These were now facing the brigades of Wofford, Kershaw, Semmes, Anderson, and part of Benning. Being Regulars, rather than fleeing for the lives they did an about face and steadily marched off the field. And they paid the price. Colonel Hanibal Day’s First Brigade lost nealy a quarter of its strength and Colonel Sidney Burbank’s Second Brigade almost half. And, as Major DeLancey Floyd-Jones, commanding the 11th United States Infantry remarked, “without inflicting the slightest damage upon the enemy.”

6:00 p.m. – Seminary Ridge

6:00 p.m. – Emmitsburg Road north of the Peach Orchard

Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox led his five regiments of Alabamans forward. North of Wilcox was Colonel David Lang’s Florida Brigade. With just three regiments totalling only 750 men it was the smallest brigade in Lee’s army, an effect of Jefferson Davis’ policy of that all of the regiments in a brigade should be from the same state. North of the Floridians was Brigadier General Ambrose Wright’s Georgia Brigade. Almost 4,000 men were moving forward against the front of Sickles’ line along Emmitsburg Road.

Major General Andrew A. Humphreys commanded that line. He was an Old Army West Pointer that had been assigned to the Third Corps to help even out Sickles’ amateur ways. He only had two brigades, commanded by Joseph Carr and William Brewster. Sickles had transferred away his Third Brigade under Colonel George C. Burling in bits and pieces to plug holes in the line elsewhere. Now Humphreys, outnumbered, was under attack on his left and in his front, and about to be outflanked on his  right.

The Union line began to go to pieces. Both batteries were forced back, one losing four of its guns. The 11th New Jersey lost 60% of its men, including every officer above the rank of Lieutenant. The 11th Massachusetts lost a third of its men and eight color bearers. The 5th New Jersey lost half of its men.

The position was hopeless. Humphreys withdrew slowly and deliberately,frequently halting to fire on his pursuers. Not everyone took part in this steady retreat; swarms of Third Corps survivors were running headlong for the rear. But Humpreys reached Cemetery Ridge with a small but determined line of battle. About 45% of his division had become casualties.

6:00 p.m. – Along Wheatfield Road and Trostle Lane

Here he was ordered by McGilvery to hold his position as long as possible. McGilvery had discovered that a large area of Cemetery Ridge that had been abandoned by Sickles during his advance was still undefended. He needed time for his other batteries to withdraw and set up a new line on that part of Cemetery Ridge.The 9th Massachusetts would be sacrificed to buy that time.

With his guns crowded together in the Trostle farm lot, Bigelow loaded with double canister and piled ammunition beside the pieces for quick reloading. Coming in from the front and both flanks, the Mississippians were held off as long as the canister lasted. But eventually they were in among the gunners, who fought back with rammers and handspikes. Bigelow was wounded but escaped, along with two cannon. The battery lost 28 men and four guns, but bought a precious half hour for McGilvery to form a line from the rest of the batteries and bits and pieces of other refugee batteries.

After overwhelming Bigelow’s guns the 21st Mississippi continued along Trostle Lane and captured another battery, Lieutenant Malbone F. Watson’s Battery I, 5th U.S. Artillery. Humphreys’ regiment had an incredible day – it had captured eight guns along with wounded Union Brigadier General Charles K. Graham. But a third of its men were casualties and it was far to the front, all alone without support. Humphreys realized that he must fall back. And as he had no way to take away the guns he had captured, they would be recovered.

6:00 p.m. – Cemetery Ridge

Hancock personally led Colonel George Willard’s Brigade to help fill the gap. They had also come from the Washington defences, and had a score to settle. In September of 1862 they had, through no fault of the own, been surrendered to Stonewall Jackson at Harpers Ferry. After enduring a miserable winter in a parole camp and being taunted with “Harpers Ferry cowards,”  they were looking both for revenge and a chance to clear their name.

6:30 – 7:30 – The Valley of Death

The Confederate brigades of Kershaw, Semmes, and Anderson were behind the retreating Regulars. Yet another Rebel volley swept the Regulars, who finally broke, running for the safety of a line of Union troops on the slopes of Little Round Top.

The troops were Colonel William McCandless’ Brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves. They and their sister brigade under Colonel Joseph W. Fisher were another transfer from the Washington Defenses. But the Pennsylvania Reserves were veteran infantry who had volunteered in the early months of the war and fought from the Peninsula Campaign until heavy casualties transferred then to Washington to rest and recruit. Their division commander, Brigadier General Samuel W. Crawford had even been in the first fight of the war at Fort Sumter.

Crawford let the disorganized Regulars pass through his ranks, advanced the brigade a short distance, fired a volley, then grabbed the national flag of the 1st Pennsylvania Reserves from a color bearer and, followed by the cheering brigade, rode into the swamp along Plum Run. The stirring picture is only slightly marred by the fact that colorbearer Corporal Bertless Slot refused to let go of the flag. Half dragged and half running and holding onto the general’s pants leg, Slot was carried along at the head of the charge, which was unfortunately not reproduced on the handsome statue of Crawford and the flag which is along the banks of Plum Run today.

The three Confederate brigades were pulling back. This was not entirely due to Crawford’s charge (although he had certainly earned it) but because Longstreet had ordered it. Longstreet had committed all of his men. Still lacking Pickett’s Division, there were no more reinforcements or reserves. And Longstreet could plainly see the strong columns of the 6th Corps behind the Union defensive line that had arrived after their 35 mile march. He knew that pushing his tired, battered brigades against thousand of new troops was not going to work. The attack on the Union left flank was over.

6:30-7:00 – Cemetery Ridge: Confederate Attacks

Lang’s Floridians charged Gulian Wier’s Battery C, 5th United States Artillery. Weir ran out of canister and lost three guns before he was able to limber up and escape. Wright’s Georgians smashed into Colonel Geotge Ward’s 15th Massachusetts and Lieutenant Colonel George Huston’s 82nd New York at the Codori Farm. After a deadly exchange of musketry the Confederates outflanked the Union position. Ward and Huston were both killed, and their regiments withdrew. The next target for Wright’s Georgians was Lieutenant Fred Brown’s 1st Rhode Island Artillery, Battery B behind the Codori Farm buildings. The battery defended itself with case shot, then canister, then double canister, but finally the Georgians were in amongst the guns. Brown was wounded, but withdrew three of his six guns.

Wright’s men continued up the ridge to the Union line, defended by Brigadier General Alexander Webb’s Brigade of the Second Corps. Webb let the Georgians advance to point blank range before he ordered the 69th Pennsylvania to open fire. After a brief fight the Georgians were “forced back in confusion.” Wright was taking fire from in front and both flanks, and saw no support in sight. He felt he had no choice but to turn around, abandon his captured guns, and fight his way back across Emmitsburg Road while he could.

6:30-7:00 – Anderson’s Attacks Miscarry

6:30-7:00 – Cemetery Ridge: Union Counterattacks

A bit to the south, the 39th New York from Willard’s Brigade attacked the 21st Mississippi from Barksdale’s, driving them off and recapturing Watson’s lost guns. Lieutenant Samuel Peeples, an officer with the battery, had come along with a rifle to help get his guns back. Exhausted and leaderless, Barksdale’s Brigade withdrew, having lost half its men.

Back at McGilvery’s gun line, Major General Alpheus Williams’s Division appeared from Culp’s Hill. Williams sent Brigadier General Henry Lockwood’s Brigade forward to the Trostle farm to reclaim Bigelow’s captured guns. Lockwood had just arrived the night before from Baltimore, another welcome last minute Union reinforcement.

Hancock was riding back from posting Willard’s Brigade when he saw what he thought was a group of retreating Third Corps men, and rode to rally them. He was greeted with a shower of rifle fire and hurriedly rode back to find someone to plug into this new hole. He found a very small regiment providing support for Lieutenant Evan Thomas’ Battery C, 4th United States Artillery. It was Colonel William Colville’s 1st Minnesota, just 260 strong. Hancock pointed at the approaching Confederate force. “Advance, Colonel, and take those colors,”

The 1st Minnesota were veterans of all the battles in the east from Bull Run on, and they knew what they were getting into. They fixed bayonets and swept down on Cadmus Wilcox’s Alabamans, forcing them back. A deadly short range firefight broke out. Colonel Colvill was wounded, but the fight continued. Eventually the Minnesotans withdrew when union reinforcements arrived. They had lost 215 men – more than 85%. Only 47 men remained in the ranks, with not a single man missing or captured. Wilcox also withdrew, being unable to continue or to stay there under heavy artillery fire. It is true that Colville did not capture Wilcox’s flag, but Hancock forgave him and wrote that “I cannot speak too highly of this regiment or its commander in this attack.”

Shortly afterwards Colonel Francis Randall’s 13th Vermont Regiment arrived from behind the Cemetery and reported to Hancock. Hancock sent them to retake Weir’s Battery. Never before in action, the Vermonters charged down the slope at the double quick and overran the Confederate line. They recaptured Weir’s guns and took 80 prisoners as well.

6:30 p.m. – Culp’s Hill

7:00 – 10 p.m. – Culp’s Hill

Major General Edward Johnson’s Division of Early’s Second Corps would make the attack with about 4,700 men. He would be using three of his four brigades, since Brigadier General James A. Walker’s Stonewall Brigade was guarding the Division’s flank all day. Jones’ Virginia Brigade and Williams’ (Nicholls’) Louisiana Brigade had the harder climbs. At the top they found breastworks, some even with had logs, that provided excellent protection for the defenders. Colonel Jones went down and the attack was driven back. The heavily outnumbered 60th New York suffered relatively light casualties behind their fortifications, while the Virginians and Louisianans suffered much higher losses out in the open.

Steuart’s Brigade had the easiest climb, as the hill was much lower at its southern end, although most of its regiments had to wade cross Rock Creek. The two regiments on its left flank also found that the trenches they were attacking were empty, with their former occupants on their way to the aid of Sickles. This left the last regiment on the end of Greene’s line, Colonel David Ireland’s 137th New York, open to fire from its flank and front. Ireland was forced to fall back. Fortunately Greene had foreseen this contingency and had created a traverse which covered the flank of the manned part of the defenses. Ireland pulled back into the traverse and was able to hold it against Steuart’s men, although he had lost a third of his regiment in the retreat.

It was chaotic for the Confederates scrambling uphill in the rocks and trees. The faint moonlight that filtered through was almost blotted out by thick clouds of black powder smoke. There were friendly fire incidents which reportedly caused casualties among the 1st Maryland.

Greene received assistance, some better than others. Colonel Richard P. Smith’s 71st Pennsylvania came over from the Second Corps line on Cemetery Ridge and took position nest to the 137th New York. After a short time the Pennsylvanians withdrew and retrurned to the Second Corps, calmly and without explanation. The Iron Brigade’s 6th Wisconsin came over from the north side of Culp’s Hill and was guided to the threatened right flank. In the darkness they walked right into a line of Confederates, who fired fired a volley that killed two men, then quickly retreated down the hill.

It was about this time when Alpheus Williams returned from Cemetery Hill with his division. He was startled to find that his trenches were occupied by Confederates. There were a number of blind and confusing minor firefights in the dark until Williams ordered his men to occupy the fields in front of the trenches until morning, when they would attack.

Johnson left Steuart in place to hold the captured ground and pulled back Jones’ and Williams’ brigades to regroup for another try come daylight. The fight for Culp’s Hill would continue in the morning after a brief rest.

7:29

7:30 p.m. – East Cemetery Hill

They were posted behind a low wall that ran along Brickyard Lane at the foot of the hill that angled northwest into the town. Harris’ Brigade held an angle at the northern end. At its southeastern end Colonel Adin B. Underwood’s 33rd Massachusetts provided a link to Steven’s Knoll, where Captain Greenlief Stevens’ 5th Maine Battery looked out over the plains below Brickyard Lane. The 33rd was part of Colonel Orland Smith’s Brigade of Brigadier General Adolph Von Steinwehr’s Division. It had not been engaged on July 1 and brought 450 men to the field. But the real strength of East Cemetery Hill was its artillery, 22 guns in four batteries. These guns had already driven Confederate Major Joseph Latimer’s batteries off Benner’s Hill in the late afternoon, and they dominated the open plain at the foot of East Cemetery Hill.

The attacking troops were two brigades from Major General Jubal Early’s Division of the Second Corps. Brigadier General Harry T. Hays commanded 5 Louisiana regiments – the “Louisiana Tigers” – and Colonel Isaac Avery commanded 3 regiments from North Carolina, with Hays in overall command. Gordon’s Brigade of 6 Georgia regiments was in support. These had been the men who crushed and routed Barlow’s Division on the day before, and they saw no reason why anything would be different on this evening.

7:30 – 10:30 p.m. – Attack on East Cemetery Hill

Stevens’ 5th Maine Battery was the first to open on the Confederates with its six Napoleons. Shortly thereafter the 22 guns on East Cemetery Hill joined. Captain Michael Wiedrich’s 1st New York Artilley, Battery I was closest to the oncoming column and quickly switched to canister. As the columns came closer the batteries switched to canister, then double canister. Then the infantry joined in from behind their wall. As the Confederates neared the wall they escaped the artillery, which could not depress their guns enough to reach them and in the darkness feared shooting into their own men.

With a wild yell the Tigers went over the wall with bayonet and musket butt. The 25th and 75th Ohio were overwhelmed and fell back uphill towards the guns, chased by the screaming Tigers. Wiedrich’s gunners defended their battery, using handspikes and rammers in hand to hand combat.

But help for the guns was on its way. Major General Carl Schurz led two regiments from the west side of Cemetary Hill at the double quick. The men who had been routed from the wall were rallying at the guns and returning to the fight. Adjutant P.F. Young of the 75th Ohio captured the flag of the 8th Louisiana. Hayes sent to Gordon, asking him to move his brigade up in support as planned, but to Hays’ dismay, Gordon had no orders to advance. Hays realized the charge had failed and ordered his Tigers back down the hill and to their starting place.

Avery’s North Carolinians had farther to go. Halfway across the field Avery was hit in the neck with a mortal wound. As the 57th North Carolina closed in, the 33rd Massachusetts opened a deadly fire, while Steven’s battery poured in canister. The North Carolinians were almost in the Union lines – “their colors were almost within reach” – when they finally broke and fell back.

Von Gilsa’s line was made of weaker stuff. The 54th and 68th New York broke and ran up the hill. Part of the 41st New York followed, although the part of the regiment next to the 33rd Massachusetts held, and the 17th Connecticut and 153rd Pennsylvania stood firm. The North Carolinians poured through the breach and went for Captain Robert Bruce Rickett’s Consolidated Battery F-G, 1st Pennsylvania Artillery. The left section of guns was overrun, and one gun was spiked. There was a long fight for the battery’s guidon, which involved two men shot, a lieutenant smashing a rebel’s head with a rock, and a Sergeant finishing the job with a clubbed muskets. Meanwhile the other guns of the battery kept firing.

The ever aware Hancock heard the noise from the other side of Cemetery Hill and sent Colonel Samuel S. Caroll’s Brigade to help. Caroll launched a bayonet charge that swept the North Carolinians off the hill, across Brickyard Lane and into the fields on the other side, when total darkness halted pursuit. Howard asked Carroll to remain on East Cemetery Hill, as he had no confidence in his remaining infantry. But the fighting was over for the day.

8 p.m.

9:00 p.m. – Meade’s Council of War

A report came from Colonel George Sharpe’s Bureau of Military Intelligence that of the 1,300 prisoners of war held by the Provost marshall, every unit in Lee’s army was represented – except for the three brigades of Pickett’s Division. Hancock immediately told Meade, General, we have got them nicked!” He could see that Lee had thrown in all of his forces except the small division of Pickett, and had been “repulsed at all points.”

A few hours of discussion showed the generals were in good spirits and of similar mind. Supplies were a concern – there was only one day’s rations left for the army. It was estimated that the army could field about 58,000 men the next day.

The group concluded they should stay and fight on.

Evening – Lee’s Headquarters