4 a.m.

5 a.m.

7:30 a.m.

8:00 a.m.

9:00 a.m.

On the Cashtown Road, Heth’s men finished their deployment and slowly began to advance against brisk Union fire from breechloading carbines. Four guns from John H. Calef’s Battery A, Second United States Artillery soon joined the Union fire.

Heth at this point had fulfilled Hill’s orders to find out what was in Gettysburg – obviously not militia, and with a stubborn attitude that suggested veteran troops. He should probably have fallen back to make his report or at least broken off his attack to wait for instructions. Instead. he ordered his men to advance and take the town.

Reynolds and Wadsworth were about three miles south of Gettysburg when a courier rode up with a message from Buford: Rebels were advancing in force from the west and Buford’s men were fully engaged. Reynolds immediately headed into town at a gallop. He found Buford west of town on Seminary Ridge. Reynolds sent a despatch to Meade, promising to hold off the advancing Confederates as long as possible, if necessary fighting through the streets of the city.

10:00 a.m.

Federal Signalman Aaron Jerome, stationed in the cupola of the Lutheran Theological Seminary on Seminary Ridge, spotted the Union First Corps south of town, advancing up Emmitsburg Road. Reynolds headed back south to meet his men and guide them into place. Aides took down fences along Emmitsburg Road to allow the First Corps to cut across the fields to the fighting. Reynolds sat his horse for some time at that spot to guide his men, then spurred ahead of the column to place the leading unit.

Lysander Cutler’s Brigade was in the lead, followed by James Hall’s Second Maine Battery. Reynolds led them north across Emmitsburg Road, positioning the battery between the road and the unfinished railroad cut. He then hurried back to place the next unit in the column, Solomon Meredith’s Iron Brigade. These were hard fighting “westerners” from Wisconsin, Indiana and Michigan, known by their Regular Army black hats.

10:30 – South of Chambersburg Pike

As Reynolds led the Iron Brigade through Herbst Woods (also known as Reynolds or McPherson’s Woods) Archer was bringing his small brigade from Alabama and Tennessee up the swampy bank from Willoughby Run. Both sides met with an explosion of musketry. A quarter of the 2nd Wisconsin was cut down, with Colonel Lucius Fairchild losing his arm and Lieutenant Colonel George Stevens killed, but the regiment continued forward, supported by the 7th Wisconsin on its flank. As the Second Wisconsin passed Reynolds in its charge he turned to guide following units and was struck in the back of his head, falling instantly dead. Aides went in search of division commander Major General Abner Doubleday to tell him he was now in command of the battle.

Archer’s brigade found itself somewhat disorganized after crossing the swampy creek bottom. It was surrounded on three sides and fighting up a boggy hillside with no support. They were surprised to find they were fighting not cavalry or militia, but veteran infantry from the Army of the Potomac. The 7th and 14th Tennessee were stopped and forced back into the ravine. 

The rest of the Iron Brigade came over the crest of McPhersons Ridge in echelon and slammed into Archer’s men. Colonel Henry Morrow’s 24th Michigan on the left flank of the Union line overlapped the 13th Alabama on the right flank of the Confederate line. Morrow curved his regiment around the 13’s flank and struck toward their rear. While much of Archer’s Brigade withdrew back across the creek, many of his men took refuge in the tangle of Herbst Woods as they were surrounded by Northerners. Patrick Mahoney of the 2nd Wisconsin waded into the confusion and brought out an exhausted and somewhat battered Confederate officer. It was Brigadier General James Archer, who became the first general officer of the Army of Northern Virginia to be captured in the Civil War. 

Archer’s Brigade was leaderless and its men killed, captured or in full retreat. The Confederate attack South of Chambersburg Pike had failed.

10:30 – North of Chambersburg Pike

North of the Pike it was a different story. Cutler’s Brigade did not have the same luck with their timing as the Iron Brigade. 

Confederate Brigadier General Joseph Davis was going into his first battle. He was the nephew of the Confederate President Jefferson Davis, which was the main reason he was a general. One of his four regiments had been left behind at Cashtown to guard the wagon trains. Of his remaining three, the 2nd Mississippi was veteran, but the 42nd Mississippi and the 55th North Carolina had never seen battle. Their advantage was that as new regiments they were still relatively large.

And they had a bit of luck. Davis’ three regiments came over the crest of the ridge while Cutler’s three lead Union regiments, the 56th Pennsylvania and the 76th and 147th New York, were still deploying and moving into position. The Confederate regiments charged into Cutler’s men, driving them back down the slope while the 55th North Carolina ovelapped and began to flank the Union line. Both sides were taking heavy casualties but the Union regiments were in danger of being overwhelmed. Division commander Brigadier General James Wadsworth sent runners to the regiments to pull back to a new line on Seminary Ridge. Two of the regiments managed to pull back in disorder and began to reform; the 76th New York lost almost half of its men.

But just after the commander of the 147th New York, Lieutenant Colonel Francis C. Miller, received the order he was badly wounded in the throat. He never passed it on to his men, and they continued to fight, increasingly surrounded. After some time Wadsworth saw that the 147th had not moved and sent an aide with another order to withdraw. This one made it and the men ran for the rear, every man for himself, although Sergeant William Wybourn carried the regimental colors to safety in spite of being wounded. The half hour fight cost the 147th 75% casualties.

Davis’ Brigade had had won a victory to offset the disaster to Archer’s Brigade. But he was rapidly losing control of his men. Two of his regimental commanders were down, and junior officers and NCOs were spreading out, taking their men after targets of opportunity. The biggest of which was the Union artillery battery along the Pike.

10:45 – Along the Pike and the unfinished railroad

Two other regiments from Cutler’s Brigade (the 84th and 95th New York) had been posted south of the Chambersburg Pike, where Captain James A. Hall had deployed the six 3″ Rifles of his 2nd Maine Battery. (Cutler’s sixth regiment, the 7th Indiana, had been left at Emmitsburg to guard the corps wagon trains until relieved by another regiment, but had begun marching for Gettysburg, on reports of the fighting.)

Hall’s battery began dueling with a Confederate battery, but suddenly Confederate infantry showed up only fifty yards away from the direction where Cutler was supposed to be covering the battery’s flank. Hall turned two sections of his guns to the right and began to spray his attackers with double canister. It slowed them down for the moment, but it was obvious that it was no position for artillery. The last stand of the 147th New York bought time for the 2nd Maine Battery to make its withdrawal – barely.  From the battery’s monument: “Hall ordered the battery to withdraw by sections when their own supporting infantry began retreating. One piece was left behind when all of its horses were shot down or bayoneted, but Hall was able to return and rescue it during a lull in the fighting.” One of the pieces had to be rolled away by hand, and the artillerymen fought with Confederate skirmishers as they passed through the fence to get on the Emmitsburg Pike.

Doubleday saw the disaster unfolding. He had held Lieutenant Colonel Rufus Dawes’ 6th Wisconsin from the Iron Brigade in reserve. Now he ordered them to counterattack Davis. Dawes advanced the regiment at a run, aligned on the rail fence along the Pike, and opened a deadly fire. 

Davis’ disordered men swarmed into the railroad cut and returned fire. But the railroad cut was not as useful as they had hoped. For most of its length it was too deep to fire out of, and the men were so crowded that it was difficult to move. 

11:00 – Along the Pike and the unfinished railroad

Dawes knew that remaining out in the open would be fatal and decided to charge the cut. He was surprised when the 84th and 95th New York moved up and joined him on his left. The charge was costly, with men falling at almost every step, but the three regiments reached the edge of the cut and began pouring a deadly fire into the disorganized Confederates. The right companies of the 6th Wisconsin swung down into the entry to the cut and began to fire down its length. A dozen Northerners went down before the flag of the 2nd Mississippi was captured. Dawes sought out the commander of the Confederate regiment and demanded his surrender. To his surprise, Major John Blair of the 2nd Mississippi handed over his sword. The fighting came to a quick halt, and although some Confederates at the west end of the cut were able to escape, the 6th Wisconsin alone took 232 prisoners.

The cost was high. The 6th Wisconsin lost almost half of its men, with the entire color guard being shot down. The 84th and 95th New York also lost heavily. But Davis’ survivors fell back, and Heth’s initial attack was over.

Confederate Second Corps commander Richard Ewell was with Robert Rodes’ Division on the way to Cashtown from the north when a courier from A.P. Hill reached him with the news that Hill was sending two of his divisions to Gettysburg. Ewell promptly changed his destination to Gettysburg – Lee’s orders gave him the freedom to do that. He then sent a courier to Jubal Early, marching his division on a parallel road, to also make for Gettysburg.

When they were about four miles north of Gettysburg Ewell and Rodes were surprised to hear artillery fire from the town. They rode ahead, and from the top of Oak Hill saw laid out before him the entire morning’s battle. Ewell’s men were in a perfect position to attack the Union flank and rear. It was true that Lee had cautioned all of his commanders that he did not want to become engaged in a pitched battle before all of his army was concentrated. But here was obviously a battle already in progress, and Ewell had been presented with a opportunity most generals only dream of.

11:30 – Noon

Heth pulled his battered brigades back to Herr Ridge and decided to wait for further instructions. It had been a costly reconnaissance.

Doubleday reorganized his line. The rest of the First Corps was arriving to reinforce Wadsworth’s Division. Baxter’s Brigade from Robinson’s 2nd Division anchored the Union right flank where Mummasburg Road crossed Oak Ridge. Cutler’s survivors were next in line to the south. There was a wide gap in the Union line around the unfinished railroad. To its south Stone’s Brigade of the 3rd Division was about 500 yards ahead of the line north of the railroad, on the McPherson farm. The Iron Brigade was to its south, beginning at the Herbst Woods. Its left flank, on open ground, was refused. Biddle’s Brigade of the 3rd Division was at the far left of the Union line, behind the crest of McPherson’s Ridge. Paul’s Brigade of the Second Division was in reserve around the Seminary.  About 700 yards south of Biddle the 8th Illinois Cavalry was posted on Fairfield Road to watch the First Corps’ flank. 

Eleventh Corps commander Major General Oliver O. Howard had been ordered to follow the First Corps to Gettysburg. While on the march he received an order from Reynolds to get his corps up “with all speed” and to put “a reserve of infantry and artillery on Cemetery Hill.” Howard rode ahead to look at the ground. He agreed with Reynolds’ and Buford’s opinion that the high ground south of Gettysurg was the position to defend, and headed into town to get a view of the fighting. Citizens led him to a viewing platform on the roof of a building, which was where a messenger found him with the news of Reynolds’ death. Howard assumed command, the third Union general to take command at Gettysburg in a few short hours.

12:30 – 1:00 p.m.

As Rodes’ Division came near town on Carlisle Road he directed it to leave the road, march to Oak Hill, and form for attack there. This would give him the advantage of position as well as the high ground. Rodes had the largest division in the Army of Northern Virginia. Launching this powerful force into the Union flank would be devastating.

Barlow’s and Schurz’s Divisions of the 11th Corps reached Gettyburg from the south. They marched through town and began to deploy on the plains north of the city. The divisions were very understrength after their disaster at the Battle of Chancellorsville, with only about 5,200 men to face Ewell’s Confederate Second Corps.

An artillery duel broke out between Rodes’ batteries on Oak Hill and Eleventh Corps batteries on the plain north of Gettysburg.

1:30 p.m.

General Lee arrived on the battlefield and joined A.P. Hill. on Herr Ridge. Lee was alarmed that his orders to avoid a general engagement had been ignored, but at the time he arrived there was no infantry fighting, only arillery duels. Heth asked permission to launch another attack with his two fresh brigades, but was refused. Lee also received an aide from Jeb Stuart – the first news he had received from his cavalry commander in a week. Lee sent the aide back to Stuart with orders to join Lee at once. But Stuart could not possibly arrive before the end of July 2.

2:00 p.m.

2:30 p.m. – Oak Ridge

Rodes’ Division launched its attack. It was a good plan, beginning with a side by side attack by O’Neal’s and Iverson’s Brigades, then feeding in Daniels’ Brigade on the left while Doles Brigade guarded the left flank from counterattacks by the 11th Corps. Ramseur’s Brigade was in reserve, while Carter’s Battalion would provide artillery support.

But the execution of the plan was a disaster. O Neal did not coordinate his attack with Iverson, but went off independently, and left his 3rd Alabama behind. He did not send ahead skirmishers. Worst of all, he did not advance with his brigade, but stayed behind. The result was that the three regiments who did attack – the 6th, 12th and 26th Alabama – went off course and rather than flanking the Union line, struck it head on at its strongest point.

They ran into five small but veteran regiments in Brigadier General Henry Baxter’s Brigade. Baxter had arrived at his position under cover and was a surprise to O’Neal’s men. The three regiments that met the attack – the 12th Massachusetts and the 88th and 90th Pennsylvania –  had a good solid stone wall alongside Mummasburg Road to take cover behind and steady their rifles.  Additionally, the 45th New York and Battery I, 1st Ohio Light Artillery from the Eleventh Corps raked O’Neal’s flank. In a half hour O’Neil’s brigade broke and left the field in disorder, having lost 40% casualties.

Iverson’s Brigade – the 5th, 12th, 20th, and 23rd North Carolina – fared even worse. He, too, sent his brigade off to the attack independently without scouting and without skirmishers. And like O’Neil, Iverson also chose to stay behind while his brigade went forward. Without O’Neal’s Brigde on his left flank, Iverson’s men were completely exposed as they crossed an open field, well closed up in a compact line. 

Baxter met the new threat by shifting his men along the stone wall and having them conceal themselves and their colors. Iverson’s men thought they were advancing unopposed against a gap ahead of them in the Union line. As the North Carolina battle line passed by and the range reached 100 yards the Union line rose up on their flank, took careful aim, and delivered a devastating volley.

The next day an observer noted that 79 dead men had fallen in a perfectly straight line. Survivors dropped to the ground; anyone who raised their head was killed or wounded. Soon men were waving hats and handkerchiefs in surrender. Baxter led his men over the wall, taking 322 prisoners and three flags. Two thirds of Iverson’s Brigade had been lost in a handful of minutes. The worst hit was the 23rd North Carolina. It had lost 89% of its strength, leaving only 34 men still with its ranks. The dead were buried together on the spot in what became known as Iverson’s Pits; it is said to be one of the most haunted spots on the battlefield.

3:00 – 4:00 p.m. Barlow Knoll

North of Gettysburg Barlow’s Division and Schurz’s Division (now under Schimmelfennig with Schurz moved up to command the 11th Corps)  were spread very thin – just four understrength brigades defending a mile of ground. Barlow had advanced his division to the only bit of defensible ground, a small hill known as Blocher’s Knoll, which would be known ever after as Barlow’s Knoll. Unfortunately the knoll was a good 300 yards forward of Schurz’s defensive line, which would leave Barlow too far from supporting troops and with his flank hanging in the air.

Early’s Division moved down the Harrisburg Road deployed in a line three brigades wide that overlapped Barlow’s line by a half mile. Early sent Gordon’s Brigade of Georgians straight at Barlow to pin him in place while Hays’ Louisianians and Avery’s North Carolinians attacked his exposed flank. At the same time Doles’ Georgia Brigade from Rodes’ Division, moving south along Carlisle Road, would hit Barlow’s other flank.

The knoll was held by barely 900 men in three regiments from Colonel Leopold von Gilsa’s Brigade, the 54th and 68th New York in the first line and 153rd Pennsylvania in support. Before the Confederate flanking regiments could attack, Gordon’s Brigade of around 1,500 men overwhelmed the New Yorkers and then caused 211 casualties to the Pennsylvanians in a few short minutes. Von Gilsa’s three regiments broke for the rear. Barlow and von Gilsa did their best to hold them, but Barlow went down with a bullet in his side and von Gilsa’s shouts and oaths were ignored.

Ames’ Brigade, already fighting Dole’s Georgians in their front, was hit by Gordon in the flank. An attempted counterattack by the 17th Connecticut and 75th Ohio was stopped cold by a deadly crossfire; Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Fowler, commanding the 17th, was decapitated by an artillery shell, and Ames’ Brigade joined von Gilsa’s stampede. Barlow’s Division had lasted barely 20 minutes.

Colonel Wladimir Krzyzanowski’s Brigade advanced across the fields and deployed to try to halt Doles’ charging line. The two battle lines fought it out at only 100 yards distance until Early’s advancing men began hitting Krzyzanowski’s’s flanks and forcing them back, one after another. Krzyzanowski’s men withdrew into town.

Howard had held onto Steinwehr’s Division as a reserve until this point, refusing requests for reinforcements from both Doubleday and Schurz. Now he sent Coster’s Brigade, half of the division, to try to help the disaster to his Eleventh Corps. Coster marched through Gettysburg and formed a battle line just north of the town. For a short time it covered the retreat of the rest of the corps, but then Avery’s and Hays’ Brigades attacked and forced it to join in the retreat, losing many prisoners.

3.00 – 3:30 p.m. – Seminary and McPherson Ridges.

There was a short breather while Iverson’s and O’Neill’s shattered brigades were replaced by Rodes’ three fresh brigades, Daniels‘, Doles‘, and Ramsuer’s. At the same time Baxter’s men fell back to replenish their almost empty cartridge boxes, and their place was taken by Brigadier General Gabriel Paul’s Brigade from the First Corps.

Daniel’s North Carolina Brigade attacked south, following a path to the left of Iverson’s and making for the railroad cut. Daniel had to detach two regiments to deal with the results of Iverson’s failed attack. Ahead he was facing Roy Stone’s Bucktail Brigade, three regiments of Pennsylvanians from the First Corps who were on the far side of the cut. Daniels’ men were advancing under heavy fire, but many made it to the railroad cut and ducked into it. They, too, discovered it was poor cover, as Lieutenant James Stewart’s 4th United States Artillery, Battery B was positioned at its eastern end and could fire down the length of the cut. Daniels’ attack dissolved under heavy artillery and rifle fire and the men ran for the rear.

But Daniels reformed his regiments, added the two that had been left out of the first assault, and tried again. Roy Stone went down with a wound and was captured. His senior Colonel, Langhorne Wistar, also went down. But this attack was also thrown back.

Heth once again asked Lee for permission for his Division to attack. This time Lee told him to be ready for his order. Lee realized that like it or not, a battle was underway. He had been given the opportunity to take on a portion of the Army of the Potomac which he both outnumbered and which he could attack on the front and flank. And Lee, the ultimate gambler, could not turn down that chance.

At the same time Doubleday was asking Howard for reinforcements from his Eleventh Cotps or, failing that, permission to fall back to Seminary Ridge “while he was still able to do so in good order.” Howard refused both requests. The First Corps was on its own.

The far left flank of the First Corps was Colonel Chapman Biddle’s Brigade. Already understrength, its 151st Pensylvania Infantry Regiment was detached as the corps reserve. Biddle’s remaining three regiments, the 850 men of the 80th New York and the 121st and 142nd Pennsylvania, were on open ground that had no defensive features, with a large gap between them and the Iron Brigade to their right, and only Buford’s cavalry pickets to their left. And in their front was Brigadier General James J. Pettigrew’s Brigade, the largest brigade in the Army of Northern Virginia, 2,600 men of the 11th, 26th, 47th and 52nd North Carolina.

Biddle’s outnumbered and outflanked brigade put up a wall of musketry, but it began to crumble from its threatened flank inward. It tried to refuse (pull back) its left flank to meet the challenge but lacked both the men and the time, and collapsed into a fleeing mass heading for Seminary Ridge.

Doubleday sent in the First Corps’ last reserves, a single regiment, the 151st Pennsylvania, to support the flank of the Iron Brigade. All were slowly pushed back towards Seminary Ridge. The lines were separated by mere yards, and fighting was often hand to hand.

The severity can be seen in the casualties from the 24th Michigan and the 26th North Carolina, who faced each other. Both were large regiments. The 24th went into battle with 496 men and lost 363 casualties. Five Color Bearers were killed and all the Color Guard were killed or wounded. In the end Colonel Henry Morrow took the colors and was wounded. The 26th had 840 men at the start of the battle and lost 624, Fourteen of its color bearers became casualties, and its Company F had every one of its 91 men killed or wounded, including its Colonel Henry Burgwyn, who was mortally wounded carrying the colors..

After holding McPherson’s Ridge for most of the day, the First Corps was finally forced back to Seminary Ridge. But it was still dangerous, and moving it again it would take an assault by fresh troops – Major General Dorsey Pender’s Division of Hill’s Corps – to force it back.

4:00 p.m. – Seminary Ridge

The infantry of the First Corps had been badly battered in the mornings fighting, and their ranks were thin as they formed up for a last ditch defense of Seminary Ridge. But the corps artillery under Colonel Charles Wainwright was still strong, with 18 guns massed on a line 200 yards wide. Facing them were two fresh brigades – Scales’ North Carolinians and Perrin’s South Carolinians – from Major General Dorsey Pender’s Division of the Third Corps.

Wainwright’s barrage was devastating, and when the Carolinians were within infantry range it grew even worse. In the words of Colonel William Robinson of the 7th Wisconsin, “their ranks went down like grass before a scythe.”  One company of South Carolinians lost 34 out of 39 men at the opening volley.

But the Union line had a weakness – it had too few men, which made it too short. Perrin’s Brigade overlapped the Union line to the south, and once again Biddle’s Brigade was chewed away by flank attacks. And to the north the Eleventh Corps could be seen retreating headlong, hotly pursued by Confederates. The First Corps infantry began to make their way to the rear.

Wainwright finally decided to limber up his guns and move to the rear as well, but he ordered his gunners to “move at a walk” so as not to panic the infantry. As the last guns made it onto the Pike Confederate skirmishers opened fire, and the Union infantry cleared the road.  Wainwright finally gave the order to gallop. He lost one 3 inch Rifle and three caissons, but was lucky to escape at all.

The last Union troops to pull out were Paul’s Brigade, holding the “hinge” with the departed Eleventh Cops at Mummasberg Road. Paul had been shot in the face and blinded early on, and division commander John Robinson gave the order for the 16th Maine to act as rear guard while the rest of the brigade escaped. Although its Colonel Charles Tilden protested, Robinson sternly ordered them to hold at any cost. Both knew it was virtually a death or prison sentence. Only 35 survivors remained that night of the 298 men of the regiment. Colonel Tilden was among the captured.

The assault on the Seminary Hill line was costly for Pender’s men. Brigadier General Scales was wounded by a shell, and every field officer of his regiments except one became a casualty. Of his 1,350 men, only 500 were with the ranks by evening.

The Union retreat through the town back to the high ground of Cemetery Hill was chaotic. Union troops were streaming in from the north and west, many with Confederates in hot pursuit. Some men retained unit cohesion, and some would turn and fire on their pursuers before continuing. But many had lost all organization, making their way individually to the safety of Union reserves on Cemetery Hill.

Moving through Gettysburg was also disrupting to the pursuing Confederates. Groups of men split off to chase down fugitives in side alleys and inside houses. A Union chaplain, the Reverend Horatio Howe, was shot and killed coming out of Christ Lutheran Church, which was being used as a field hospital. Brigadier General Alexander Schimmelfennig was trapped in a blind alley and hid under a midden for the next few days while the homeowners slipped him bread and water.

Those Union fugitives that made it to Cemetery Hill were cheered to find Major General Winfield Scott Hancock in command. Meade had briefed Hancock the night before at his headquarters and sent him ahead of his Second Corps with written orders to take command of the battlefield, even though he was junior to Howard. He arrived at around 4:00, established a tense but working relationship with Howard, and went to work strengthening the defences. One of his first orders was for Abner Doubleday to send men to occupy Culp’s Hill. When Doubleday protested that the First Corps was fought out and badly depleted, Hancock replied, “I want you to understand that I am in command here. Send every man you have.”

One small but welcome reinforcement reached the First Corps at this time. On the initiative of its Colonel, Ira G. Grover, the 7th Indiana Infantry had left its post guarding the Corps ammunition and supply trains at Emmitsburg around mid-morning (its replacement was on the way) and marched for the sound of the guns. They arrived in time to be added to the right flank of the First Corps line digging in on Culp’s Hill – over 400 very welcome fresh men,

Hancock was the fifth Union general to take command at Gettysburg. He had 1,600 fresh troops from Brigadier General Orland Smith’s Brigade of the Eleventh Corps, and probably another 7,000 survivors of the days battle who were still effective. He was weak in infantry but strong in artillery, much of whom had survived the day’s fighting. Many more reinforcements would be arriving within hours. And thanks to Buford, Reynolds, and thousands of other brave men, he had the high ground.

5:25 p.m.

Lee rode to meet Ewell and ordered him to attack the heights “if practicable.” But Ewell still had only two divisions of his Second Corps. Edward Johnson’s Division had been held up all day behind Hill’s supply train, and would not arrive until after sunset. 

Lee understood that A.P. Hill’s two divisions that had fought all day were in no shape to try to attack the Union position. Ewell felt the same way about his two divisions. They had overrun the Union Eleventh Corps and part of the First Corps, engaged in a confusing and disorganizing fighting pursuit through the town, and had taken many casualties. He was willing to attack – if he could have help from Hill. It was a good example of why Lee had not wanted to start a battle without all of his men being concentrated – now he didn’t have the fresh troops to lock in his victory.

There soon was an additional complication. In the absence of the army’s cavalry, William “Extra Billy” Smith’s Brigade was guarding Ewell’s left flank. Now he reported a “heavy column of the enemy” coming from the northeast. To be safe, Ewell sent Gordon’s Brigade to join Smith, reducing his possible attack force even more.

In the end, Lee accepted that Ewell did not find the attack “practicable.” It would have to be postponed to first thing in the morning, using Johnson’s fresh division.

5:30

Major General Henry Slocum’s Twelfth Corps began to approach the southern part of the battlefield, with John Geary’s Division advancing up the Baltimore Pike and Alpheus Williams’ Division moving up country roads east of Rock Creek. Slocum himself held back his personal arrival. He was the senior corps commander of the army and would have responsibility once he arrived – but he wanted nothing to do with the disaster which had occurred. Before leaving for Taneytown to make his report once things were in order, Hancock finally told him that Meade had ordered Slocum to take command.

Geary’s Division took position along Cemetery Ridge, while Williams was prepared to attack Benner’s Hill northeast of Gettysburg. But news reached him that the army had fallen back south of Gettysburg, and Williams pulled back to a position along the Baltimore Pike for the night.

8:00

The most distant part of the Army of the Potomac was Major General John Sedgwick’s Sixth Corps, 35 miles away at Manchester, Maryland. It was the army’s largest corps, good troops under a competent general, and Meade needed them. Sedgwick received his orders at around 8:00 and had his men on the road within the hour to march through the night. 

Dusk

After Midnight