During the night

4:30 a.m. – Daybreak,
Seminary Ridge

At dawn Lee rode to Longstreet’s headquarters to observe his morning attack. The sounds of fighting broke out on Culp’s Hill, showing that Ewell keeping up his part of Lee’s plan. But something was wrong at First Corps headquarters. There were no attack preparations underway. Instead, Longstreet still wanted to put forward his idea for moving around the Union flank. Lee rejected him, and flat out ordered Logstreet to prepare Pickett’s Division to attack.

Further increasing Lee’s annoyance, Pickett was still in the rear. When he had arrived at the end of the day yesterday Lee had told him to bivouack there and let his men rest, and he would tell him when he needed him. But so far, no one had told Pickett anything. Now it was going to take some time to get Pickett up and into position. Meanwhile Lee sent off to Ewell to hold off his attack until Longstreet was ready, which would be at 10 a.m. Ewell replied, “too late to recall.”

4:30 – Daybreak, Culp’s Hill

The assault was almost a repeat from the last night, only in dayltime, which gave the Union soldiers better shooting. On the higher elevation of the north part of the hill the Confederates did no better than the night before. After an initial costly rush they settled down to a firefight against opponents who were well protected behind fortifications.

On the lower slopes where the Yankees had fewer or no fortifications it was a slightly different story. But the Union regiments still had good cover overlooking an open meadow that the Steuart’s men would have to cross. As soon as the Rebels left their trenches the Union artillery resumed firing, and no Confederate artillery replied. There were even enough Union reserves that regiments could be rotated off the line to replenish their ammunition and clean their fouled guns. Geary’s Division alone fired an average of 70 rounds apiece during the day – 277,000 rounds total.

6:00 a.m. – Lower Culp’s Hill

When the order was delivered to Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Mudge of the 2nd Massachusetts he questioned it. The order was read back to him. He replied, “Well, It is murder, but it’s an order.” The 2nd Massachusetts and Lieutenant Colonel John R. Fesler’s 27th Indiana charged – some 600 men. They were immediately met by fire from around 1,000 pf Steuart’s men in their trench behind a wall. Colonel Mudge was killed. Five Massachusetts color bearers were killed and the entire Indiana color guard shot down. Finally the order was given to withdraw, and the regiments fell back to a stone wall near where they started. The 2nd lost 43% casualties, the 27th lost 32%.

8:30 a.m. – Culp’s Hill

As before, the attack was thrown back with heavy casualties. The Union line was too strong and too well protected. But Ewell wanted to keep the pressure on until at least 10:00 a.m., when Longstreet was to launch his assault. So the attacks continued.

9 a.m.

The attack became popularly known as “Pickett’s Charge” even though only 3 of its 11 brigades were from Pickett’s Division. In addition to Pickett’s Division the attack would include six brigades from two divisions of Hill’s Third Corps under the command of Major General Isaac Trimble and Brigadier General James Pettigrew.  Two more of Hill’s brigades from Anderson’s Division would provide support on Pickett’s flank.

The inclusion of some of Hill’s regiments was questionable. Hill’s Corps had been badly battered on July 1, its units were under strength, it had lost many of their commanders, and had numbers of lightly wounded men in the ranks. Command of the two divisions was a danger sign; James Pettigrew replaced Major General Henry Heth, who had been wounded on July 1, and Issac Trimble had taken over the division of Major General William Pender, who had been mortally wounded on July 2. Trimble had yet to even meet his new command.

Most of the attacking force was to be from all three of A.P. Hill’s divisions and yet Pickett from the First Corps led the attack while Longstreet was in overall command. This did not speak well of Lee’s trust in A.P. Hill at this time. Hill was the newest and youngest corps commander, had been sick on July 1, and Lee was angry with him for allowing Heth to get drawn into the battle on July 1.

10:00 – 11:00 a.m. – Culp’s Hill

The fighting on and around Culp’s Hill had gone on for almost seven hours, and the Union line held. The Confederate assaults were over well before Lee could launch Longstreet’s attack. That afternoon Culp’s Hill was quiet, and no Union reinforcements would be drawn away from Pickett’s assault. Johnson had lost about a third of his division, 2,000 men, and another 800 were lost by the two brigades from Rodes’ Division. The Union 12th Corps lost 1,000 casualties, with only about 300 of those from George Greene’s well fortified brigade that had held the greater part of the hill.

1:07 p.m. –

The Bombardment

The aiming point for many Confederate batteries was a small woods in the center of the Union line, visible even in the dense cannon smoke, that would become known as “the Copse of Trees.” Most shells sailed over the Union lines. The dense clouds of smoke made aiming very difficult. Guns tended to dig in their trails and fire higher as the barrage went on, shooting over their intended targets. Confederate fuses were notoriously faulty, and many projectiles exploded at the wrong distance or failed to explode at all.

The result was the area behind the Union line was swept by the barrage. It quickly emptied of orderlies, wounded, and camp followers. Hunt was forced to move his reserve artillery park to a safe distance. Meade had to move his headquarters from the Leister farm immediately behind the center of the Union line. The house was hit at least four times, Meade was narrowly missed, his Chief of Staff Daniel Butterfield was wounded, and sixteen horses of the aides and orderies were killed and lay dead in the garden.

Alexander Hays kept his men occupied rounding up stray rifles and cleaning and loading them to have ready for the inevitable Infantry assault. Some men had four rifles beside them behind their wall. Hays also moved the troops from his support line up to the wall so that they were mingled with the first line troops, in places three or four deep. This along with all of their extra rifles meant they would be able to produce an incredible volumne of fire. Winfield Scott Hancock rode the line amidst the explosions, his orderly with the corps flag behind him. John Gibbon, on foot after his orderly had been killed, walked the line speaking with his men, then went out in front of the wall and sat in the shade of some small trees.

2:00 p.m.-Pennsylvania College

1:30 – 2:30 p.m.

On the Confederate side of the field it was the infantry that suffered while the artillery got off lightly. Much of the infantry massed for the charge behind the batteries, so overshoots ended up plowing into dense groups of men. They took what cover they could while Lomgstreet and other officers rode or walked among them to keep up order and morale.

After around an hour and a half the Confederate batteries began to run low on ammunition. Some Union batteries in the front lines that were out of long range ammunition and some who had lost guns had been pulled out to be replaced by fresh batteries, and Union artillery fire was slacking. It was now or never to launch the Confederate infantry.

The Confederate bombardment abruptly paused. Three cannon were fired rapidly. It was the signal for 13,000 men to step off and march the three quarters of a mile to the Union lines.

2:30 – 3:00 p.m. – Pickett’s Charge, Part 1

On the left were the Third Corps brigades. Heth’s Division, now under by James Pettigrew since Heth’s wound on July 1, was in the first row. His four brigades formed each regiment in a double line of battle: five companies in two ranks in the first row, then the second five companies in a second row. Colonel Birkett Fry, who had replaced the captured Archer, commanded (from the right) the 1st Tennessee, 14th Alabama, 7th Tennessee, and 5th Alabama Battalion.  Colonel James Marshall’s Brigade of North Carolinians. formerly Pettigrew’s, had the 47th, 26th, 52nd and 11th regiments. Joseph Davis’ Brigade had the 55th North Carolina and the 2nd, 42nd, and 11th Mississippi. Finally, John Brockenbrough Brigade of Virginians had the 40th and 22nd Battalion and the 47th and 55th Virginia. Brockenbrough’s men started late and had to run to catch up. All of Pettigrew’s brigades had been badly battered and suffered heavy casualties on July 1, and some had only been included as a result of their convenient location on the field rather than their combat worthiness.

Trimble’s two North Carolina brigades followed about 150 yards behind Pettigrew. William Lowrance’s Brigade, formerly Scales, was on the right and had the 16th, 22nd, 34th, 13th, and 38th. James Lane’s Brigade on the left had the 7th, 37th, 28th, 18th, and 33rd. Trimble’s line was only wide enough to provide support for two of Pettigrew’s brigades, Fry and Marshall. Davis and Brockenbrough, two very shaky brigades on the left flank of Pettigrew’s line, would have no support.

As soon as the Confederate infantry formed their lines and moved out the Union artillery opened back up, including Union batteries that had withheld their fire during the bombardment. Confederate guns now mostly stayed silent, both because many had exhausted most of their long range ammunition during the barrage, but also because their faulty fuses made it dangerous to fire over their own troops. Men began to drop, but the Confederate lines closed up and continued forward. The slightly rolling countours of the ground would protect the advancing men for a time as parts of a line disappeared from view. But it was a short reprieve, and the lines contracted as men fell and the survivors closed up the ranks.

3:00 – 3:30 p.m. – Pickett’s Charge Part 2, Pettigrew’s & Trimbles’ brigades

Now the column was crossing Emmitsburg Road and dealing with the fences that lined it on both sides. Those along Pettigrew’s stretch were too sturdy to be easily taken down and troops had to scramble over them, making good targets. Heavy rifle fire started to add to the Confederate casualties.

Pettigrew’s hand was painfully torn by shrapnel and his horse was killed. Birkett Fry was shot through the leg and was down. James Marshall was hit by two shots to the head and killed. His four regimental commanders were all down. The stretch of Emmitsburg Road where Pettigrew’s division crossed was in a slight depression, a small bit of shelter in the storm. Without their senior officers and facing a desperate 200 yard uphill climb toward a sheet of fire, many of Pettigrew’s men balked at leaving the relative safety of the road.

Davis’ Brigade was “reduced to a line of skirmishers.” A small group from the 11th Mississippi with their fifth color bearer made it up the slope to the Brian (or Bryan) Barn. They waited for more men to join them before they rushed the thousands of Yankees who were packed behind the stone wall. But soon they realized they were alone, unable to advance or retreat.

Less than a thousand of Fry’s and Marshall’s men left the road to advance up the slope. The 26th North Carolina had lost 14 color bearers on July 1 and now lost 4 more along with its colors. Lieutenant Colonel John Graves’ 47th North Carolina brought about 150 men within 40 yards of the wall before being unable to advance farther. They stopped to wait for the supports of Trimble’s line. Some small groups made it within a few yards of the wall.

Trimble’s line, never strong to begin with, suffered just as badly as Pettigrew’s. Trimble went down; he would lose his leg and be captured. The few men who made it past the piled bodies and confusion of the Emmitsburg Road had little strength or organization. Like Pettigrew’s survivors, they were little more than skirmish lines. A steady stream of men made their way to the rear, although many did not dare to stand in the hail of fire and waited to be captured.

This did not mean that Hays’ men were unscathed. Massed as they were, they presented a difficult target to miss even behind their stone wall. The 111th New York lost four color bearers and the 1st Delaware two. Colonel Thomas J. Smythe, commanding one of Hays’ brigades, was wounded but stayed in command, and Colonel Eliakim Sherrill, commanding the other brigade (Hays’ third brigade was still on East Cemetery Hill from the night before), was mortally wounded. Hays lost two horses, and 14 of his 20 orderlies were hit.

But Hays’ position was never in doubt. Any Confederate that got close to the wall died or became a prisoner. The shattered survivors made their way back to Seminary Ridge.

3:00 – 3:30 p.m. – Pickett’s Charge Part 2, Pickett’s Division

Pickett accompanied the attacking column as far as the Codori farm buildings. He then took position there, which was an appropriate location for a major general whose duty was to observe and guide the assault. He sent a message to Longstreet stating that he thought the attack would be successful in reaching and breaking the Union lines, but he believed additional support would be needed for his men to maintain their position. He asked for Hill’s two support brigades to be committed, which was ordered.

Pickett’s division needed to oblique, or march at a 45% angle, to meet up with Pettigrew’s men so they could hit the Union line together. This was a difficult movement, especially under heavy fire, but they did it flawlessly. However, it exposed Kemper’s Brigade to flanking fire as they crossed in front of Stannard’s Vermont Brigade (13th, 14th & 16th Vermont), Gates’ two First Corps regiments (80th New York and 151st Pennsylvania) and Harrow’s Brigade (19th Maine, 15th Massachusetts, 1st Minnesota, and 82nd New York).

The front of the Confederate column was now narrowed to a width of about 500 yards, centered on the Copse of Trees. Pickett’s two lead brigades had taken high casualties and were becoming badly disorganized. Kemper was shot off his horse, but he would live. Garnet was shot dead from his horse. But Armistead’s Brigade in the second line had been somewhat screened by Garnet and Kemper and was better able to maintain its organization. Armistead led on foot with his felt hat perched on the tip of his sword, although it kept sliding down.

After twenty to thirty minutes of marching under heavy fire with men dropping every minute, the first Confederates approached the low stone wall of the Union line.

3:30 – 4:00 p.m. – Pickett’s Charge: At and Over the Wall

As Pickett’s men surged up to the stone wall, now a huge “mingled mass,” according to one Confederate officer, the eight companies of the 71st Pennsylvania broke and ran, leaving a fifty yard gap to the north of Cushing’s two surviving guns. Cushing was instantly killed by his third wound. But his two surviving guns, now commanded by Sergeant Frederick Fuger, were loaded with their last rounds of canister and waited until the very final moment to fire.

To the south of the Copse of Trees the 59th New York, just four companies command by Captain William McFadden (after Lieurenant Colonel Max A. Thoman had been mortally wounded on July 2) abruptly dissolved and ran for the rear. A group of Virginians led by a major, yelling, “take the guns!” rushed to the gap in the Union line. Blocking their way was Captain Andrew Cowan’s 1st New York Independent Battery, now down to its last rounds of canister. Cowan was amazed when Union Artillery Chief Henry Hunt appeared on horseback next to him, firing his pistol into the Confederates and shouting, “See ’em, see ’em!” Then Hunt’s horse went down, trapping Hunt underneath. The Confederate Major had almost reached Cowan’s guns when they fired their last rounds. When the smoke cleared not a man remained in front of them. The battery’s monument states, “Double canister at ten yards.” Hunt was rescued and, provided with a new horse, rode off to the next crisis.

Isolated between the two gaps in the line was Colonel Dennis O’Kane’s 69th Pennsylvania, an Irish regiment who flew an emerald green flag instead of the state colors. With regiments running for the rear on both sides and Pickett’s Division coming right at them, the 69th opened a deadly fire and stuck hard to their low wall directly in front of the Copse of Trees. It would be the only regiment to hold the line at the wall during the charge, but it paid a heavy price. Colonel O’Kane and Lieutenant Colonel Martin Tschudy were killed, and the 68th lost 143 men out of 268,

Stannard had seen his opportunity as Pickett’s column passed diagonally by off to his right. He had the 13th, 14th and 16th Vermont Infantry Regiments swing out of the Union line, with the 13th and 16th facing the flank of Kemper’s Brigade. The Vermont Regiments’ nine months enlistments were almost up. They had never been in battle before Gettysburg and so were unusually large regiments. But they were well drilled and fought like veterans, forcing the the 11th and 24th Virginia on the right flank of Kemper’s lines to turn and deal with them. The rest of Kemper’s Brigade edged off to the left, away from the fire of the Vermonters. Kemper was shot from his horse, badly wounded, although he would live. The brigade had half its regiments facing south fighting Stannard, the rest advancing, and all of them suffering from heavy casualties, the loss of its commander and all but one of its regimental commanders.

Two Union generals also went down at about this time. Gibbon was shot in the arm and shoulder while brining troops forward and had to leave the field. And Hancock had just finished speaking with Stannard on the execution of his maneuver when he was shot in the thigh. He was helped from his horse and a tourniquet placed on the leg. He would would not allow himself to be carried off until the fighting was over. He would survive although the wound would trouble him for years, but he was out of the battle.

North of the Copse, Armistead led his brigade through the disorganized mass of Kemper’s and Garnett’s survivors. Lieutenant Colonel Martin of the 53rd Virginia jumped over the wall and immediately went down with a shattered thigh. Armistead stepped over the wall shouting, “Give them the cold steel, boys!” He was followed by the color bearer of the 53rd Virginia and somewhere between 100 to 300 men. They were not just from his brigade, but also Kemper’s, Garnett’s and even some of Fry’s who had come down over the Angle. They seized Cushing’s guns and turned one around to face its former owners, but with no ammunition or equipment to fire it was an empty gesture.

About 90 yards ahead was Hall’s second line, with the 72nd and 106th Pennsylvania and some of the rallied men from the 71st. Hall tried to get them to advance but they refused, willing to stand and fire and take casualties, but unwilling to move one step closer. Hall gave up on them and crossed the deadly ground to join the 68th Pennsylvania to do what he could there, probably passing within steps of Armistead as he did so.

Colonel John Bowie Magruder of the 57th Virginia came over the wall and was mortally wounded by two bullets. A few men continued to trickle across the wall from the mass on the other side, but there were too few leaders left to move anyone as a group. Many positioned themselves behind the low stone wall and began firing back.

For maybe ten minutes the fighting at the Angle was intense and deadly. But the ground was too open, there were too few Confederates and too many Union troops close at hand. Armistead went down, mortally wounded, not far from where Cushing had fallen. The toehold collapsed. Some of the men slipped back over the wall. Others moved into the cover of the Copse of trees. It became known as the “High Water Mark of the Confederacy.”

There was still a large and dangerous force of Confederates on their side of the wall, and a troublesome amount in the Copse of Trees. Webb’s battered regiments needed help. Lieutenant Colonel Arthur F. Devereaux of the 19th Massachusetts had collared Hancock as he rode by and asked permission to attack the breakthrough, which Hancock immediately gave. Devereaux brought with him Colonel James E. Mallon’s 42nd New York Infantry Regiment. With the 42nd leading, both regiments swarmed at the double into the woods and opened fire at close range. Both regiments lost their color bearers in the melee.

At the same time Gibbon’s aide, Lieutenant Frank Haskell, went looking for reinforcements. He found Colonel Norman J. Hall, whose line along the wall was not threatened, although it was blazing away at Kemper. Hall agreed to send help, and in spite of the noise and confusion managed to send half of Lieutenant Colonel Amos E. Steele, Jr.’s 7th Michigan along with Lieutenant Colonel George N. Macy’s 20th Massachusetts. Further down the line, Brigadier General William Harrow’s four regiments followed Hall into the fighting.

Haskell made his way back along the line and persuaded the color bearer of the 72nd to move the colors forward. A tipping point had been reached as Union reinforcements made their numbers felt. All along the line south of he Angle Union troops surged forward and pushed over the wall. Among the Confederates who did not make their way to the rear hands went up and handkerchiefs came out.

Lang’s and Wicox’s Brigades

Both Lang and Wilcox quickly decided that they were making a useless sacrifice and needed to withdraw. Lang’s Floridians suffered the worst, hit by both artillery and Stannard’s infantry, losing 60% casualties.. The two brigades lost 360 prisoners, and the 2nd Florida lost its flag.

4:00 – 6:00 p.m. – Aftermath

On the other side of the field Pickett was in shock as he rode towards Seminary Ridge. Lee and Longstreet met the returning survivors. Lee took full responsibility for the failure and asked the exhausted men to reform as best they could and prepare for an attack by Meade. But most of Pickett’s remaining men were

But there would be no counterattack. Meade’s army had been too badly battered and had lost too many men and officers. Hancock was down, and so was Gibbon and Stannard and at least seven regimental commanders. And it was now late in the day. By the time fresh troops were brought from around the battlefield and formed for an attack there would be little daylight left.

1:00 – 3:00 p.m. – East Cavalry Field, Part 1

But he found a his way ahead blocked by John McIntosh’s Brigade of David McM. Gregg’s Second Cavalry Division. It was accompanied by George Custer’s Michigan Cavalry Brigade. Custer had originally been ordered to move to the left flank of the army when Gregg showed up. But he told Gregg that it looked like a fight was about to break out, and offered to stay on if Gregg gave him the order. Gregg gladly did so.

Gregg began an artillery duel with Stuart, which he quickly won. At the same time Stuart was trying to pin the Union cavalry in place with dismounted skirmishers, but the Yankee skirmishers were aggressive and pushed back.

Stuart then launched Colonel James H. Drake’s 1st Virginia Cavalry in a mounted charge. Gregg ordered Custer to send Colonel William D’Anton Mann’s 7th Michigan Cavalry to counter charge, which Custer led himself. Both charge and counter charge came together on a fence line in mid field. A huge confused melee followed until the Wolverines managed to take down the fence and drive the Virginians back. But Stuart threw in squadrons from each of his brigades to drive off Custer’s pursuing men.

East Cavalry Field, Part 2

Hit from several directions and with their leader badly hurt, Hampton’s men pulled back. The Union cavalry was too exhausted to follow. Stuart broke off and gave up his plan to move his cavalry onto Meade’s line of retreat. Gregg lost 254 men, 219 of them from Custer’s Brigade. Stuart lost 181. It was a tactical draw, but a Union strategic win. The Union cavalry was finally starting to meet Stuart’s men on an equal basis.

5:30 p.m. – Merritt’s Attack

Facing him was Hood’s Division of the First Corps, under the command of Brigadier General Evander Law since Hood had been badly wounded on July 2. They had taken heavy casualties in the attack on Little Round Top and Longstreet had convinced Lee not to use them in Pickett’s Charge. They were left to guard the army’s southern flank. But they were still quite dangerous, especially against cavalry, which Hood’s men deemed “a picnic,” and “only a frolic.”

Kilpatrick sent Merritt in a dismounted attack up the west side of Emmirsburg Road. In four hours of skirmishing against Brigadier General George Anderson’s Georgians they moved a short distance along the Emmitburg Road until heavy rains forced fighting to a close.

5:30 p.m. – Farnsworth’s Charge

They rode down the Cofederate skirmishers but quickly came up against “Rebs… by the thousands.” The cavalry frantically rode about looking for a target and then for escspe, being shot from their horses by enemies on all sides. Farnsworth was trapped and refused to surrender. He was hit five times and killed. His men suffered nearly 100 casualties. Major William Wells of the 1st Vermont Cavalry (whose monument is at the starting point of the attack) brought the survivors back to Union lines.

6:00 p.m. – Starr’s Destruction

7:30 – Sunset

Evening

1:00 a.m.